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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Note verbale dated 21 May 1993 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note dated 12 April 1993 soliciting the comments and suggestions of Governments on the question of assistance to third countries that sustain economic damage arising from the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has the honour to present hereunder the observations and suggestions of the Egyptian Government in this regard.

The question of providing assistance to third countries that sustain damage arising from the imposition of sanctions has taken on particular importance in light of the fact that the Security Council has proceeded to impose economic sanctions in the framework of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and of the damage arising from the imposition of sanctions subsequently sustained by certain countries as a result of their compliance with the provisions of the resolutions under which the sanctions were imposed. The objective of the framers of the Charter in incorporating the provisions of Article 50 should therefore be carefully and meticulously examined and agreement should be reached on the measures that must be taken to mitigate suffering and prevent serious damage to any country.

1. In the first instance, stress should be placed on the principle of the equitable sharing of the costs and responsibilities of the collective security system so that no country or group of countries bears a disproportionate or unwarranted burden by virtue of its participation in the system.

2. The experience of the recent past has clearly shown that there is a need to re-examine the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter, and it has been demonstrated that the international financial institutions presently in

existence are unable to respond in a rapid and effective manner to the enormous number of claims presented by countries that have sustained damage. This is primarily due to the fact that these institutions lack the appropriate mechanisms and the necessary funds to respond to the requests made by countries. This is altogether natural, since they were not originally established for this purpose. Perhaps the truest testimony to the foregoing is the continued suffering of a large number of countries and their concern to devise an alternative system to prevent the aggravation or repetition of such suffering.

3. Article 50 of the Charter states that "... any [other] State, ..., which finds itself confronted with [special] economic problems [arising from the carrying out of those measures] shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems".

This right to consult raises three basic issues, namely:

(a) The fact that consultation between a country that has sustained damage and the Security Council is a right guaranteed under the Charter;

(b) The fact that consultation is not a goal in itself but that the objective is to solve the problems arising from the imposition of sanctions;

(c) The timing of the consultation, inasmuch as it is clear that, together with consultation after the imposition of sanctions, consultation before the imposition of sanctions with countries that may sustain damage would undoubtedly be very useful as a preventive measure contributing to the limitation of the scale and range of the negative impact there might be on the economies of third countries arising out of the imposition of the sanctions.

4. In light of the foregoing, Egypt proposes the establishment of an appropriate mechanism taking the form of a standing committee of the Council, in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter, to perform two basic functions on its behalf:

First, to consult with countries susceptible to damage before imposing sanctions, although it should be stressed that the objective of such consultation would be restricted to exploring and identifying the most appropriate form for sanctions that would achieve their objective without inflicting unwarranted damage on any third party and should not, under any circumstances, have the goal of placing limitations on the principle of sanctions itself, which would remain of the essence of the Council's authority;

Secondly, to consult with countries that have sustained damage after the imposition of sanctions and to report to the Council in that regard, while bearing in mind that relative damage may differ from one country to another according to the overall scale of the economy and the extent of its dependence on a specific sector or sectors that may be affected by the imposition of sanctions on another country. This will help to direct assistance to claimant countries in terms of the proportionate and equitable distribution of any resources that become available for that purpose.

5. In an endeavour to secure the financial resources required to meet the claims of countries that have sustained damage, it may be appropriate for a fund to be established that is basically sustained by assessed contributions on the basis of the scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations as an outcome of activities mandated by the Security Council. At the same time, countries should be urged to make voluntary contributions to the fund as their participation in meeting the responsibilities of the collective security system.

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt requests that this note be circulated as an official document of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 10, and of the Security Council.

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Secretary-General the assurances of its highest consideration.

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 16 of its resolution 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General:

> "to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants and in any case before 30 April 1993, a report on the situation in Angola together with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process, and in the meantime to keep the Council regularly informed".

2. Subsequently, on 11 March 1993, my Special Representative for Angola, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, presented an extensive oral report to the Council. On 12 March, the Council adopted resolution 811 (1993), by paragraph 9 of which it, inter alia, requested a progress report "on the efforts for the resumption of the talks between the two parties in Angola at all appropriate levels". In response, an oral report was presented to the Council on 22 April 1993.

3. On 29 April 1993, the Secretary-General addressed a letter to the President of the Council (S/25690), in which it was recommended that, since the peace talks taking place in Abidjan under United Nations auspices had not yet reached a conclusion, the mandate of UNAVEM II should be extended until 31 May 1993. The Security Council agreed to this recommendation in its resolution 823 (1993) of 30 April and requested the Secretary-General to submit the report required by Security Council resolution 811 (1993) as soon as possible, and in any case before 31 May 1993, as well as to keep the Council regularly informed. A further oral report was made to the Council on 14 May 1993.

I. POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

4. In my report to the Security Council dated 21 January 1993 (S/25140 and Add.1), I stated that, to all intents and purposes, Angola had returned to civil war and was probably in an even worse situation than before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991. Since then, regrettably, the conflict has escalated throughout the territory with dire consequences for the people of Angola. This unfortunate deterioration has occurred despite intensified

international efforts to steer the peace process back on track. In my report to the Council of 21 January 1993, I described the arrangements being made by UNAVEM II to facilitate a political and military meeting between the representatives of the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the auspices of the United Nations, with a view to restoring the cease-fire and resuming implementation of the Bicesse Accords.

5. These efforts culminated in a meeting held at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa from 27 to 30 January 1993 at which my Special Representative presided over the plenary sessions. Its agenda, agreed on by both sides, consisted of four items: (a) re-establishment of the cease-fire; (b) conclusion of the implementation of the Peace Accords; (c) role of the United Nations in establishing and maintaining the cease-fire, in the conclusion of the implementation of the Peace Accords and in the electoral process (second round of the presidential elections); and (d) release of prisoners. The meeting established a political commission which examined the items dealing with the conclusion of the implementation of the Peace Accords and the release of prisoners, and a military commission, which dealt with the re-establishment of the cease-fire. The Government and UNITA initially agreed that the future role of the United Nations would be discussed at plenary sessions as well as in both commissions, but later decided to consider it fully at the next meeting.

6. Although the two sides were unable to reach agreement on a cease-fire, they did agree on many points, leaving a small core of issues to be discussed at a second meeting in Addis Ababa which, it was agreed, was to take place on 10 February. The Addis Ababa meeting was the first direct, high-level Government/UNITA gathering since the two parties met in the Angolan city of Namibe on 26 November 1992. Subsequently, at the request of UNITA, which indicated that its delegation was encountering logistical difficulties, and with the agreement of both sides, the date for the second meeting was postponed to 26 February 1993.

7. In the event, however, UNITA again cited difficulties of a logistical and security nature that prevented it from arriving by that date, despite UNAVEM's offer of special aircraft and safety guarantees, and requested a further delay of unspecified duration. Since my Special Representative did not consider a sine die postponement appropriate, the scheduled Addis Ababa meeting had to be cancelled. In a statement on 1 March 1993, Miss Anstee regretted that that decision had had to be taken on account of logistical difficulties which the United Nations considered to have been satisfactorily solved, the more so since the meeting was critical for obtaining a cease-fire agreement. The representatives of the three observer States to the Angolan peace process - Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America - also issued a statement deploring that outcome and stating that they would consult their respective capitals "in order to take a position in view of the continuation of the conflict which impedes the full implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola and of UNITA's refusal to attend the second Addis Ababa meeting".

8. In the meantime, civil war was continuing to rage throughout most of the country, both sides attacking and counter-attacking each other to score territorial and strategic gains and strengthen their negotiating position.

Huambo, the second largest city in Angola and the capital of the Ovimbundu heartland, was the centre of a savage battle that lasted for almost two months, resulting in massive destruction and heavy loss of human lives, estimated at over 10,000. On 7 March 1993, the Government announced that its forces had withdrawn from Huambo "for strategic reasons". UNITA, on its part, said that it had taken full control of the city. Information on present conditions in the city is at best sketchy and unconfirmed, since United Nations requests for access to assess the humanitarian relief needs of the civilian population have so far not received the complete agreement of both sides to the conflict. Other cities have also been the scene of intense fighting or under siege. UNITA obtained control of diamond-producing areas and captured the oil-producing centre of Soyo. The Government recaptured Soyo in March, but UNITA renewed its attacks on the port. The Government has also retaken Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, 30 miles from the capital, Luanda. UNITA has kept up a sustained offensive against the towns of Kuito/Bie and Menongue, which the Government is hard-pressed to defend. The strategic town of Malange, while strongly held by government forces, has been under siege since January 1993, with supplies - insufficient for a population swelled by refugees from the surrounding countryside - being brought in only by air. Bombardment of Luena and Saurimo has also intensified. The Government, in the meantime, claims to have recaptured the diamond-producing areas of Cafunfo and Luzamba, as well as the provincial capital of Cuanza Norte - N'dalatando - and Wako Kungo in Cuanza Sul province. UNITA refutes these claims. What is clear is that fighting throughout the country has intensified with all the human suffering that goes with it. Over all, UNITA is estimated to occupy roughly 75 per cent of Angola's territory.

9. In the light of this steadily worsening situation and the collapse of the Addis Ababa negotiations, it was clear that local opportunities for negotiating a peaceful solution had been exhausted and that action was required at the highest political level. I asked my Special Representative to come to New York from 9 to 12 March 1993 to consult with me and to brief the Security Council. In her briefing to the Council, Miss Anstee outlined several options for UNAVEM II, which included the deployment of a major peace-keeping force. The Special Representative emphasized that it was essential to review UNAVEM's mandate and make it more relevant to the very changed circumstances now prevailing. Following informal consultations, the Security Council adopted resolution 811 (1993) of 12 March which demanded an immediate cease-fire throughout the country. The resolution also called, inter alia, on the two parties, particularly UNITA, to produce early evidence, not later than 30 March 1993, that real progress had been made towards the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", and invited the Secretary-General to seek to organize a meeting between the Government and UNITA at the highest possible level before 30 April 1993. So far, my intensive efforts to persuade President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to meet personally have been to no avail.

10. Meanwhile, various contacts aimed at finding a peaceful solution continued, and bilateral talks between the United States and a UNITA delegation were held in Abidjan from 25 to 29 March 1993. A government delegation was also on hand for informal consultations with the United States delegation, but did not take part in the talks. A statement issued by the United States after the meeting expressed the view that both parties seemed prepared to meet under United Nations auspices by 12 April 1993, and enumerated a number of interrelated

issues that were suggested for discussion. On 2 April 1993, I instructed my Special Representative to consult with the Government and with UNITA on a date and venue for the resumption of direct talks under the auspices of the United Nations. As a result of these consultations, agreement was reached to meet in Abidjan on 12 April 1993 at the invitation of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire.

11. The talks began as scheduled in Abidjan, under the auspices of the United Nations and the chairmanship of my Special Representative. Besides the delegations of the two parties and of the United Nations, the three observer States also took part. At the opening session, the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire gave a welcoming address on behalf of the host Government and a message was also read out on my behalf. The President of Côte d'Ivoire, H.E. Mr. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, took a close interest in the discussions and met several times with my Special Representative and the two delegations, as well as with representatives of the observer countries. The two delegations immediately agreed to the following agenda, which was presented by my Special Representative:

1. A cease-fire.

2. Completion of the Bicesse Accords.

3. National reconciliation, to include broadened participation by UNITA at the national, provincial and local levels.

4. Future role for the United Nations in the Angolan peace process.

5. Release of all prisoners/detainees through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

6. Creation of the necessary conditions to permit emergency, humanitarian assistance to all Angolans.

7. Definition of the powers of provincial administration.

8. Guarantees for the security of people and property.

9. Freedom of the press.

12. The Abidjan meeting lasted six weeks. Regrettably, despite intensive efforts virtually round the clock and during weekends, it ended without agreement on 21 May 1993. The first week was devoted to exhaustive discussion of the nine agenda items. Thereafter efforts concentrated on the preparation of a Protocol of Abidjan which, once signed, would immediately lead to a cease-fire and provide the basis for its implementation. The draft Protocol also assumes that the Security Council would authorize an expanded United Nations peace-keeping presence with a much wider mandate than that of UNAVEM II, together with commensurately greater resources, including armed troops for carrying out various functions in support of the peace process.

13. The first draft of the Protocol, which was prepared by the representatives of the three observer countries, attempted, within the context of the Bicesse Accords and the policies laid down by the Security Council, especially in its

resolutions 804 (1993) and 811 (1993), to synthesize the positions expressed by the two parties and to approximate views where they differed. This first draft was exhaustively discussed and revised over the succeeding weeks and was supplemented by a Memorandum of Understanding interpreting each of its 38 points. It was to be supported by several annexes covering, inter alia, the future role of the United Nations; the reconstitution of the Joint Military/Political Commission, with full membership of the United Nations, and the setting up, under this Commission, of a new Military Committee to be chaired by the United Nations; the status of Mr. Savimbi; and national reconciliation, spelling out how UNITA would be incorporated at all levels of government - central, provincial and local. The above-mentioned document on the future United Nations role - a revised version of the document annexed to my report to the Security Council of 21 January 1993 - had been largely agreed by the two delegations, in a working group set up on this subject, with only one or two points outstanding. These included arrangements for the security of UNITA leaders and installations and the role of the United Nations in the second round of presidential elections.

14. The fundamental concept on which the negotiations were based, and which flowed from the earlier attempts at negotiating a settlement, was that the Government would show political flexibility, facilitating a much larger role for UNITA in government structures in return for military withdrawals by UNITA. Although the pace of advance was painfully slow, progress towards agreement on the Protocol was made. By 5 May 1993, a further revision of the draft Protocol was produced, which reflected agreement on most of the points. Among those still under discussion, however, three major areas of disagreement of particular interest to UNITA remained unresolved:

(a) Firstly, UNITA wished to see a direct linkage between the extension of the central administration to the areas occupied by UNITA and the simultaneous implementation of the national reconciliation exercise giving UNITA a greater role in government administration at all levels;

(b) Secondly, UNITA insisted that, in order to make a cease-fire work and provide sufficient security guarantees, a substantial number of armed United Nations troops should arrive in Angola before UNITA troops moved from the cities, towns and villages occupied since the resumption of hostilities;

(c) Thirdly, UNITA maintained that there should be parity and simultaneity in the movement, withdrawal and quartering of government and UNITA troops, thus requiring far-reaching military as well as political concessions from the Government.

15. The government delegation, which had already visited Luanda briefly on two previous occasions for consultation, made a third trip on 5 May 1993 to present this latest version to President dos Santos and the Council of Ministers. The delegation returned on 8 May 1993 and informed Miss Anstee and the observer delegations that, although it had some observations on the text, it was authorized to initial it as it stood. The UNITA delegation left on 8 May for a three-day visit to consult with Mr. Savimbi, an absence which extended to six days; the delay was attributed to logistical problems and the need to meet with military commanders at the front. When the talks resumed on 14 May 1993, it became evident that, while the Government was ready to accept the Protocol as

drafted, UNITA wished to propose a number of significant amendments, of which the most important related to the three issues mentioned above. Total breakdown was narrowly averted on 15 May 1993 by an initiative to put Mr. Savimbi in direct contact with myself and with President Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire. I sent a message to the former late that night with a personal appeal to sign the Protocol, and the following day Mr. Savimbi talked to me at length by telephone and asked for an extension of the negotiations by one week. Given the fast approach of the end of the expiration of the mandate of UNAVEM II, I agreed to a five-day extension until 21 May 1993, and Miss Anstee immediately set in motion a further round of intensive discussions. The government delegation went to Luanda again to meet with President dos Santos on 17 May 1993 and stated on its return early the next morning that it was authorized to commit the Government to appoint UNITA administrators to appropriate provincial and local positions simultaneously with the extension of the central administration to the areas now occupied by UNITA, after the withdrawal of the latter's troops to quartering areas, certified by the United Nations. This concession met the first of UNITA's three major concerns listed in paragraph 14 above.

16. The second concern, the prior arrival of armed United Nations troops, is clearly not a matter that could be decided at the Abidjan talks, but requires a decision of the Security Council, which could be taken only once the Protocol was signed. Proper cooperation of troop-contributing countries was also needed. However, my Special Representative repeatedly drew the two delegations' attention to the statements reiterated by the Council that it was willing to act quickly in the event of an agreement, most recently in paragraph 3 of resolution 823 (1993) of 30 April. The main rock on which the talks foundered was UNITA's insistence on absolute parity in the simultaneous movement and quartering of government and UNITA troops, rather than just of UNITA troops, as drafted in the Memorandum of Understanding. Despite strenuous last-minute efforts to resolve this problem, including various attempts to reformulate the relevant paragraph, no advance could be made during the five-day extension of the talks.

17. On 21 May 1993 my Special Representative had regretfully to suspend the talks, expressing the hope that different counsels might prevail before long that would permit their being reopened and a cease-fire agreed. In this event, it would be important to build on the basis of the draft Protocol in which so much useful work has been invested, and not to reopen issues already agreed. It is important not to lose the positive momentum generated in Abidjan. That is why I hope the talks can be resumed without prolonged delay. Regrettably, in the meantime, a further intensification of the suffering of the Angolan people, who have already endured so much, seems tragically inevitable as the war continues. Humanitarian aid becomes increasingly vital; hence the importance of the international appeal being launched on 3 June 1993 and of obtaining agreement from the two sides to the emergency plan referred to in paragraphs 24 and 25 below.

18. The danger that the Angolan conflict could be widened even further is reflected in mutual allegations by both protagonists of the involvement of external parties and the use by the other side of mercenaries and other foreign forces. At a summit meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 2 April 1993, the southern African front-line States, a subregional group that includes Angola, declared that the Angolan Government had a legitimate right to use all means to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to this end appealed to the

international community to provide assistance to the Government. On their part, the three observer countries have reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict within the framework of the Bicesse Accords and, in a statement issued on 28 February 1993 in Lisbon following a meeting of senior officials of the three countries, called for the immediate and effective cessation of any military or paramilitary external interference on Angolan territory, in accordance with Security Council resolution 804 (1993) of 29 January. The observers have also stressed consistently that the United Nations has an essential role to play in the context of the peace process, the implementation of which, as mandated by the Council, takes place under the auspices of the United Nations.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

19. I welcome the increased attention of the international community to the worsening humanitarian consequences of this tragic Angolan conflict. The resumption of civil war has led to the deaths of many thousands of Angolans and the wounding of many thousands more. With the escalation of fighting, the spectre of starvation, sickness and disease stalks the land, with massive internal displacements of people and escalating movements of refugees fleeing combat areas. My Special Representative has reported that a humanitarian disaster of incalculable proportions is emerging, aggravated by the drought that has severely affected Angola and the entire southern African subregion in recent years. In many Angolan provinces the war has severely disrupted the country's infrastructure, agriculture, marketing and distribution networks and basic medical services. The World Food Programme (WFP) now estimates that up to nearly 2 million Angolans are suffering from hunger, drought and disease. Most recent indications, corroborated by a number of sources closely following the situation, are that at least 1,000 people are dying daily as a result of consequences of the war, including malnutrition affecting the most vulnerable groups.

20. In its resolution 811 (1993) of 12 March, the Security Council called on all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola and encouraged my Special Representative to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population in need, with the resources at her disposal. By the same resolution, the Council appealed to both parties to the conflict to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need.

21. The Council will recall that, from the outset, I had entrusted my Special Representative with the responsibility for coordinating all operations related to the peace process. In this capacity, she had already been working very closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the relevant United Nations operational organizations and agencies. These functions have now been expanded to cover all emergency humanitarian relief operations arising out of the present situation. Recently, a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, headed by a senior official with extensive operational experience and reporting directly to my Special Representative, was set up in

Luanda. Staffing and funding of the unit are still under way, but it is anticipated that some staff will be seconded from the relevant United Nations operational organizations and agencies. In the meantime, to the extent possible, UNAVEM staff are supporting this unit. All appropriate resources available to the United Nations system in Angola are being pressed into service. UNAVEM II coordinates security clearance for land and air transportation, provides communications services and, whenever possible, makes its aircraft available for humanitarian operations. In addition, UNAVEM II military and police observers, many of whom have extensive experience and knowledge of various parts of the country, accompany humanitarian flights and land convoys. As a result of these efforts, a major team effort by all United Nations agencies, in cooperation with NGOs, is under way. One of the major achievements in this regard was the transfer to Lobito and Benguela, over a five-day period, of nearly 6,000 civilian refugees, mostly women and children, who had escaped from Huambo. In the same operation, some 350 tons of food and medical supplies were transported by road and air to the needy civilian and refugee population of Caimbambo.

22. But the United Nations is able to help only a fraction of those in need. Many others, such as those in a devastated Huambo, or in the besieged towns of Kuito/Bie and Menongue, remain out of reach because of the continuing hostilities and the difficulties of persuading either side to heed the appeal that they allow unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance. In the case of Huambo, UNITA initially gave agreement for a United Nations humanitarian mission to visit the stricken city, but the Government was not ready to approve the flight. Subsequently, my Special Representative was able to obtain the agreement of President dos Santos to a joint United Nations/NGO organization mission to fly to Huambo to assess needs, but then UNITA refused clearance on the grounds that the city's needs were well known. As to Kuito/Bie and Menongue, the Government cleared the proposed supply flights, but UNITA refused to do so. Elsewhere, humanitarian assistance is being delivered to both Government- and UNITA-controlled areas, albeit with great difficulty and often at significant risk to United Nations personnel. Despite arrangements made by UNAVEM to clear each flight with both sides, and to double-check these clearances, several very serious incidents have occurred recently which resulted in fatalities and injuries. United Nations aircraft flying into the UNITA-controlled areas of Uige on 5 April 1993 and M'banza Congo on 17 April 1993 were fired at upon arrival; in Luena, another United Nations aircraft came under fire, presumably from UNITA, at a time when it was shelling the town. During the helicopter evacuation of refugees from Caimbambo, a UNAVEM helicopter sustained damage from stray bullets. On 26 April 1993, while delivering a consignment of food, a WFP aircraft was hit, presumably by a missile, at a height said to be 16,000 feet, 30 kilometres outside Luena. The aircraft managed to return to Luena and make a crash landing just short of the runway. In the hurried evacuation of the aircraft before it caught fire, the flight navigator stepped on an anti-personnel mine and later died; all of the remaining seven crew members were injured.

23. In each case, representations have been made and apologies and explanations given in return. Meanwhile, life-threatening incidents continue to recur, despite all efforts to reach agreement on adequate procedures and guarantees. For a while, all flights had to be suspended. They have now resumed, but only

to those areas where reasonable guarantees of security exist. This is highly unsatisfactory, as aid is going to only a fragment of the needy.

24. It is clear that, until such time as the fighting is stopped and a proper cease-fire negotiated, humanitarian aid can at best be only patchy and will remain a high-risk undertaking. Now that the Abidjan talks have ended in deadlock and without a cease-fire, my Special Representative has proposed to President dos Santos and to Mr. Savimbi an emergency plan for the delivery of humanitarian aid, for an initial period of one month, through mutual agreement on land and air corridors that both sides are requested to make safely accessible on specified days.

25. Up to now, immediate emergency needs have been met from existing WFP and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) stocks already in the country, but replenishments are urgently needed. By all estimates, future needs are likely to grow substantially, regardless of whether a peace agreement is possible. One of the main immediate tasks of the new United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Unit set up in late April 1993 has been to prepare and launch a comprehensive appeal for support from the international community. The plan encompasses one year - from 1 May 1993 to 30 April 1994, and envisages a total funding requirement of US$ 226 million. The appeal has been circulated to donor countries and will be the subject of an international donors' conference in Geneva on 3 June 1993, to be chaired by my Special Representative. I greatly hope that Member States will contribute swiftly and generously to this appeal.

26. There is another cause for concern in the humanitarian field. I refer to the increasing reports and mutual accusations by both parties of massive human rights violations and other atrocities committed against unarmed civilians in the course of the conflict. This not only aggravates an already high level of mutual mistrust and bitterness, but also compounds the humanitarian crisis, as those who fear real or perceived persecution increasingly take to the road in search of safety. It is imperative that both parties respect their responsibilities under international humanitarian law applicable to civilians and other persons taking no active part in armed hostilities, including the obligation to respect the right to life and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. I should also, in this connection, stress my belief that respect for human rights constitutes a vital, indeed a critical component, among measures to resolve, on a long-term basis, conflicts of this nature, including efforts to promote enduring conditions of peace, national reconciliation and democracy.

III. ROLE AND SITUATION OF UNAVEM II

27. The grave security situation resulting from the escalation of the fighting resulted in the withdrawal of UNAVEM teams from most of the 68 sites they originally occupied, and about which I informed the Security Council in section II of my report of 21 January 1993 (S/25140). Since then, a further 18 locations were evacuated, leaving only 4 still occupied by UNAVEM outside Luanda, namely Benguela, Lubango, Namibe and Sumbe. This exercise has been carried out in conformity with paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 804 (1993).

28. In pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution, I decided to reduce further the size of the Mission, which is currently made up of 49 international civilian staff, 75 military observers, 30 police observers, 12 paramedics and 70 local staff. This roughly corresponds to option (b) suggested in paragraph 30 of my previous report (S/25140). However, their number was slightly higher in February and March. Given the deterioration of the politico-military situation and the collapse of the joint monitoring and verification groups provided for under the Bicesse Accords, UNAVEM II military and police components are now concentrating their efforts on patrolling, liaising with local military and civilian officials and other confidence-building measures, as well as assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. UNAVEM II staff are also actively attempting, with some success, to retrieve United Nations property which had to be left behind during the emergency evacuation of team sites. Should both parties to the conflict agree to end hostilities under arrangements to be monitored initially by UNAVEM II, it would be necessary not only to redeploy observers expeditiously to all parts of the country, but also to expand their number very rapidly, as the present strength would clearly be inadequate to the task. It would also be necessary to provide some armed troops very urgently to perform specific tasks crucial to the maintenance of a cease-fire, even before any new mandate could be put into operation.

29. Despite the Security Council's appeals in resolutions 804 (1993) and 811 (1993), UNAVEM personnel continued to be exposed to threats, intimidation and, on occasion, physical attacks. On 23 February 1993, a United Nations Military Observer from Jordan was kidnapped at Cabinda by FLEC-Renovado, but was released on 15 March 1993 through the concerted efforts and active assistance of UNDP at Kinshasa, Zaire. On 6 March 1993, at 0040 hours, the UNAVEM camp in Cabinda was attacked by unidentified elements with machine-guns and hand grenades, resulting in the wounding of a United Nations police observer. The container converted for living purposes, generators and vehicles were seriously damaged.

30. My Special Representative was also again the target of vituperative personal attacks in the media of both the Government and UNITA. Particularly vicious and slanderous abuse was launched against her by the UNITA radio station Vorgan, impugning her integrity and moral character and implying threats against her life. I issued a statement strongly condemning this intolerable and offensive behaviour as being not only in contravention of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 811 (1993), but also counterproductive to the anticipated peace talks between the Angolan parties, and reiterating my unequivocal support for my Special Representative. Apologies and explanations subsequently proferred by UNITA were considered inadequate by the Security Council, which, as indicated in a statement made by the President of the Council on 8 April 1993, took a grave view of the broadcast and the allegations made therein. The President's statement expressed outrage and demanded that the attacks stop immediately. A further apology and retraction of the offending remarks was made to Miss Anstee by the UNITA delegation attending the Abidjan talks. In a separate development, the Vice-President of the National Assembly made public amends to my Special Representative for an earlier pejorative article he had published in the Jornal de Angola.

IV. LOGISTICS, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

31. Withdrawal from 18 of the 22 upcountry sites remaining at the time of the last report was completed often under very dangerous operational conditions. A Board of Inquiry was convened, which drew up a complete list of all material lost, stolen or abandoned since UNAVEM's first withdrawal in late 1992. The losses totalled $6.7 million, consisting of $1.9 million in vehicles and trailers, $0.4 million in communications equipment, $3.5 million in shelters, $0.6 million in generators and $0.3 million in miscellaneous equipment. Claims for compensation covering losses of personal goods are also being processed.

32. The remaining international and local staff and existing stock of vehicles, communications equipment, generators and general stores are sufficient to provide support for the 75 military observers, 30 police officers and international Professional staff in their current operational status plus deployment to four more upcountry sites, if required. Support is also provided to the Humanitarian Aid Coordination Division of UNAVEM at its present level of activity. Some excess equipment has been redeployed to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique.

33. UNAVEM II remains at phase III security status. A comprehensive security plan has been issued covering action to be taken in the event of a further spread of hostilities, and common security coordination procedures have been established with United Nations agencies operating in Angola. The UNAVEM II and WFP aircraft currently in the country have sufficient capacity to airlift all United Nations personnel to a safe haven, if the situation so dictates.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

34. The prospect that now faces Angola is more grave than ever. The hopes for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future that burgeoned during the months of relative peace that followed the signing of the Peace Accords almost exactly two years ago and the successful holding of elections in September 1992 now lie in tatters. War again engulfs almost the whole country and has penetrated many towns that survived the earlier long years of fighting unscathed. Its people, who have suffered from continuous war for over three decades, have now to contend with even more intensified conflict.

35. The breakdown of the Abidjan talks, coming at the end of a long chain of efforts to reach agreement ever since hostilities erupted again in October of last year, marks a major and tragic setback to the peace process. It is all the more deplorable in the light of the enormous efforts made to bring about reconciliation and peace. I should here like to pay special tribute to H.E. Excellency President Houphouet-Boigny for his untiring efforts of mediation and to those of his Foreign Minister, Mr. Amara Essy, as well as to the generosity of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in providing host facilities for the meeting over such a long period.

36. The failure to reach agreement in Abidjan on a cease-fire makes it essential to decide once again on the United Nations role in Angola. It would be unthinkable for the United Nations to abandon Angola at this critical

juncture. All efforts, both bilateral and those of the United Nations, must be concerted towards bringing the Angolan tragedy to an end.

37. In the present circumstances, I consider that the most practical approach is to recommend a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. Such a mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Bicesse Accords. This would be a smaller mission with a reduced number of military, police and political personnel, of which some might also be deployed in selected locations outside Luanda. This interim extension, for which preliminary cost estimates will be provided in an addendum to the present report, could be authorized initially for two months. In the event that, in this time, the parties reach an agreement through the Mission's good offices, specific proposals would be presented to the Council for adapting and strengthening the Mission's capabilities to enable it to assume whatever functions might be appropriate to ensure compliance with such an agreement. Should no agreement be forthcoming within the period of the extension, the Council would have to decide what alternative action to take.

38. With the humanitarian situation deteriorating daily, it would also be important during this interim period to devote increasing resources to coordination of that area of activity throughout the country, in support of the Emergency Humanitarian Programme being put into effect from 1 May 1993 to 30 April 1994, including the provision of adequate protection to ensure the security of the relief personnel and that aid goes only to the civilian population in need for which it is intended. This was one of the roles that the United Nations was to carry out under the expanded mandate which was considered in Abidjan. I hope that President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi will respond positively to the new arrangements which are being proposed by my Special Representative to deliver humanitarian aid to various parts of Angola. Having this in mind, I wish to reiterate my strong appeal to the Angolans to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law and to facilitate unimpeded access to deliver relief to the population in need.

39. Before concluding, I cannot conceal my deep concern at the level of physical and verbal attacks on UNAVEM II personnel. The General Assembly, in its resolution 47/72 of 14 December 1992, strongly demanded that all parties to a conflict take all measures possible to ensure the safety of peace-keeping and other United Nations personnel. As the Council itself has observed on other occasions, there appears to be a general trend developing of increasing attacks against United Nations peace-keeping missions around the world. It must be clearly understood by the Angolan parties that it is unacceptable that United Nations personnel be exposed to deliberate physical and verbal attacks in addition to the dangers inevitably inherent in any mission of this nature.

40. As to UNAVEM II personnel, they have continued to serve with dedication and exceptional courage in dangerous conditions, often putting their lives at risk. I would like to pay tribute to all of them, and in particular to my Special Representative, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, and to Brigadier-General Michael Nyambuya (Zimbabwe), who has been acting as Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II; they enjoy my fullest confidence and admiration.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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S/25841
26 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF ERITREA FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3215th meeting on 25 May 1993, the Security Council had before it the application of Eritrea (S/25793) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 94th meeting on 25 May 1993, the Committee considered the application of Eritrea and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that Eritrea should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Eritrea for admission to the United Nations (S/25793),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Eritrea be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

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S/25842
26 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF MONACO FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3216th meeting on 25 May 1993, the Security Council had before it the application of the Principality of Monaco (S/25796) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 95th meeting on 25 May 1993, the Committee considered the application of the Principality of Monaco and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that the Principality of Monaco should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the Principality of Monaco for admission to the United Nations (S/25796),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the Principality of Monaco be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

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S/25843
26 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and on the basis of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention:

During the past few weeks, bands of armed and organized terrorist mercenaries have engaged in trans-border military attacks against and sabotage in Iranian border provinces. These bands, whose headquarters and military bases are located in Iraq where military training, financial and logistical support and intelligence services are provided to them, have admittedly perpetrated terrorist activities inside Iran, resulting in martyrdom of civilians and military personnel and in infliction of damages to Iranian oil installations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has already reported some such instances to the United Nations and thereby warned Iraq against such terrorist activities by the mercenary group who has ironically given their subversive and sabotage operations wide publicity.

In response to these armed attacks from inside Iraq and in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, today 25 May 1993, the fighter jets of the Islamic Republic Air Force carried out a brief, necessary and proportionate operation against the military bases of the terrorist group where the recent armed attacks against and incursions into Iranian territory had originated.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has, on numerous occasions, warned the Government of Iraq against the use of its territory for launching armed attacks on and incursions into Iran, today's air raid against the terrorists' military bases in Iraq, a purely defensive measure in the exercise of its inherent right to self-defence, is without prejudice to Iran's policy of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and to its commitment to resolution 598 (1987) and the cease-fire between the two countries.

It would be highly appreciated if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gholamali KHOSHROO
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.